The India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, conceived in 2003 as a vehicle for South–South co-operation, now finds its defence ambitions constrained, less by geopolitics than by uneven commitment.
Of the three partners, India and Brazil are moving, however imperfectly, to consolidate domestic defence industries.
Brazil recently rolled out its first domestically produced JAS 39 Gripen E fighter jet, the result of a decade-long investment in local industry. India has spent a decade moving from a reliance on defence imports to becoming an exporter, in accordance with the nation’s principle of self-reliance.
South Africa, by contrast, appears unsure whether it wishes to remain in the game at all.
That ambivalence has become impossible to ignore. During a recent visit to Brazil, President Cyril Ramaphosa listened to Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva warning that even peaceful regions must prepare for war. His message carried an implicit challenge and a sense of urgency. “If we do not prepare ourselves, one day someone may invade us.”
Lula continued by emphasising closer industrial co-operation as both an opportunity and a necessity. The message was clear enough: Brazil is willing to build; it expects and needs South Africa to do the same.
India’s posture is similarly assertive. Its defence indigenisation began in 2015 and was backed by large procurement budgets and a willingness to absorb risk. Since then, the country has risen to become the pre-eminent power in the Indian Ocean region. By the end of 2030 India will operate more than 160 warships, most of them domestically manufactured. India will also be the second-largest operator of the French Dassault Rafale fighter, with 150 on order, and it is planning local production.
For IBSA to function as more than a diplomatic curiosity, South Africa must rise to that level of seriousness. At present, it does not.
South Africa and Brazil both operate the Saab JAS 39 Gripen, yet their trajectories diverge sharply.
Brazil’s Gripen E programme, executed with aerospace and defence company Saab, has been structured around technology transfer and domestic production. Brazilian engineers are assembling aircraft, absorbing design knowledge, integrating systems and building an industrial ecosystem that can sustain future programmes.
South Africa, by comparison, has treated its Gripen fleet as an expensive hobby. There has been little effort to leverage the platform as a strategic enabler and catalyst for industrial renewal. Had South Africa pursued a deeper partnership with Saab on upgrades, avionics or weapons integration, it could have anchored a revitalised aerospace sector. Instead, the South African Air Force (SAAF) has had its fighter budget reduced, its capacity has eroded and possibly eight of the original 26 Gripen C/D fighters are serviceable.
Procurement decisions are often divorced from industrial policy, end up stalled or are muddied by corruption
Co-operation would not be new. It was the basis for the A-Darter missile, co-developed by South Africa and Brazil through Denel and manufacturer Siatt, which is based in Brazil. South African design expertise with Brazilian industrial support produced a modern short-range air-to-air missile.
Yet such examples are rare. Denel, once the linchpin of South Africa’s defence industry, has been allowed to drift into financial and operational distress. Programmes have stalled and skilled personnel have gone. The A-Darter programme fell behind, delivering only the first four missiles in 2025.
For India and Brazil, which are investing to expand their capabilities, this raises a practical question: can South Africa still contribute at the required level?
Missile development illustrates both the potential and the risk.
Denel’s Marlin missile, a beyond-visual-range air-to-air projectile, could form the basis of a trinational programme. It has already progressed in development and undergone testing, and Denel needs investment, development skills and production capacity. India brings scale, Brazil brings manufacturing depth and South Africa contributes design heritage and knowledge.
The Marlin would be an internationally competitive product and would put South Africa in an elite group. Only the US, China, the EU, India and Russia produce missiles of such class.
But such a project demands sustained funding, coherent management and political backing. Without those, it becomes another stalled initiative, reinforcing doubts rather than building confidence.
The same pattern is visible in rotary-wing aviation. South Africa’s Denel Rooivalk helicopter remains a capable platform with a history of limited prospects due to a lack of political support. It has struggled to secure follow-on orders or meaningful upgrades.
Brazil, meanwhile, has built local assembly capacity for aircraft such as the Airbus Helicopters H225M, embedding itself in global supply chains. India has pursued three domestic helicopter programmes through Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. A collaborative effort of upgrades, sustainment or shared subsystems is conceivable, but it requires South Africa to present itself as a credible industrial partner, not a legacy platform in search of rescue.
Transport aviation offers a more immediate opportunity. South Africa has signalled its intention to buy Brazil’s Embraer C-390 Millennium tactical airlifter to replace the ageing fleet of C130 aircraft. While the SAAF has yet to place an order, air force planners have identified a requirement for at least 16 airframes, with 20 being the ideal number. India, too, is evaluating the C-390 for its transport and tanker fleets, with potential for 50 airframes.
A common platform across IBSA would generate efficiencies in training and logistics. But again, participation implies commitment. Buying the aircraft is the easy part; integrating it into a broader industrial and operational strategy is harder.
India and Brazil are looking for a partner that can invest, deliver and share risk
Naval co-operation has underpinned IBSA. It has been the forum for naval exercises that occur every two years. In the previous iteration in 2024 Brazilian, Indian and South African ships exercised off False Bay. South Africa will again be the host in October 2026, while India leads the exercises.
There is scope for more systematic training, shared doctrine and interoperability, particularly in maritime security and humanitarian operations. Expanding the training across other branches of service will only further benefit all sides, creating opportunities for doctrinal exchange and skills development.
Standardising elements of maritime surveillance would deliver practical efficiencies. The same logic extends to a gradual convergence around support helicopters and transport aircraft fleets, where commonality could reduce costs and simplify training and maintenance. These are not headline-grabbing initiatives, but they are the foundations of effective collaboration.
More ambitious still is the possibility of adopting common strike systems. India’s BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, developed as a joint venture with Russia, has attracted international attention as well as export orders from the Philippines and Indonesia.
A shared IBSA approach to such capabilities would signal a serious commitment to defence-industrial and strategic autonomy. It would also introduce political and technical complexities that South Africa, in its current state, may struggle to navigate.
All of this points to a central problem. The South African government has not treated defence as a strategic priority, and this has begun to irk its allies. Budgets are constrained, certainly, but the issue runs deeper.
There is little evidence of a coherent plan by South Africa to sustain or rebuild the domestic defence industry. Procurement decisions are often divorced from industrial policy, end up stalled or are muddied by corruption. Long-term partnerships are discussed, then neglected.
India and Brazil are looking for a partner that can invest, deliver and share risk. Without that, IBSA’s defence dimension becomes lopsided, with South Africa relegated to a peripheral role, like the one it already plays in Brics.
South Africa still possesses valuable assets: engineering talent, niche technologies and a strategic geographic position. With focused policy, these could be leveraged into meaningful contributions. Reviving Denel, or at least its viable components, would be a start. Aligning procurement with industrial participation would further assist. So would committing to a handful of joint programmes where success is achievable and visible.
Lula’s insistence that “no-one will help us except ourselves” is an argument for seriousness. India and Brazil are, in different ways, demonstrating that seriousness through investment and policy consistency. Neither country is interested in another handshake or certificate of friendship, they want friends and weapons.
IBSA is still a framework for co-operation that is both politically palatable and strategically useful. But frameworks do not build aircraft, missiles or ships —production lines do, through sustained attention and resources. Until South Africa shows that it understands this, in a less forgiving world it will find itself in a very precarious place.
